The Marriage Amendments, Equality and Partner Benefits: A Letter to the City Council of Moscow, Idaho by Brandt, Elizabeth
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Articles Faculty Works 
2009 
The Marriage Amendments, Equality and Partner Benefits: A 
Letter to the City Council of Moscow, Idaho 
Elizabeth Brandt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/faculty_scholarship 
THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENTS,
EQUALITY AND PARTNER BENEFITS:
A LETFER TO THE CITY COUNCIL OF MOSCOW, IDAHO
Elizabeth Barker Brandt,
INTRODUCTION
This short article grew out of a letter I wrote to a member of
the City Council of Moscow, Idaho. The letter was written in
response to the member's question about whether Idaho's state
constitutional amendment banning equal marriage2 precluded the
City of Moscow from providing health insurance benefits to the
same-sex domestic partners of its employees. In 2006, Idaho
voters had passed a referendum amending the state constitution
to provide that "[m]arriage between a man and a woman is the
only domestic legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this
state."3
1 Elizabeth Barker Brandt was born in 1957. She obtained her B.A. in Speech
and Theater from the College of Wooster in 1979 and her J.D. from Case
Western Reserve University in 1982, where she was elected to the Order of the
Coif. Brandt is currently the James E. Rogers Distinguished Professor and the
Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs at the University of Idaho College of Law.
She is a member of the Idaho Supreme Court's Child Protection Committee and
its Committee on Children and Families in the Courts. She is also active with
the Idaho State Bar Association and serves as secretary of the Idaho Family Law
Council. Brandt is a member of the editorial Board of the ABA Family Law
Quarterly and the Executive Committee of the Family and Juvenile Law Section
of the Association of American Law Schools.
2 1 will use the term "equal marriage" in this article. The movement to permit
marriage between same-sex couples is a movement for "marriage" - the same
kind of marriage that different-sex couples currently enjoy. The terms "gay
marriage" or "same-sex marriage" imply that same-sex couples seek some
special or different form of marriage. Moreover, the opposition to equal
marriage is part of a larger strategy to condemn and punish lesbians, bisexuals,
transgender individuals and gay men. Thus, the campaign to authorize
marriage between same-sex couples is primarily a campaign for equality. See
Interview by David Shankbone with Evan Wolfson, Founder and Executive
Director, Freedom to Marry (Sep. 30, 2007) (transcript available at
http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Interview with
gay marriage movement founder Evan Wolfson) ("We're not fighting for
gay marriage, or same-sex marriage, or any phrase like that. We are fighting for
an end to exclusion from marriage. We are fighting for the freedom to marry,
the same freedom, rules, responsibilities and respect as our non-gay brothers
and sisters have. It's not just a question of wording.").
3 IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28.
My argument to the Moscow City Council member was that
offering health care benefits to same-sex partners of city
employees constituted neither recognition nor validation of a
"domestic legal union" under the Idaho language. Unfortunately,
the recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in National
Pride at Work v. Governor of Michigan,4 regarding similar
language in an amendment to Michigan's Constitution,5 reaches a
different conclusion. The Michigan court's holding furthers the
goals of those who oppose LGBT 6 civil rights by subscribing to the
broadest possible interpretation of its state's discriminatory
amendment. The effect of the Michigan Supreme Court's
interpretation is to penalize LGBT people through public
condemnation of their relationships.7 The National Pride opinion
underscores the importance to the LGBT civil rights movement of
clearly articulating an interpretation of state constitutional
marriage amendments that supports the extension of employment
benefits to same-sex domestic partners. Such an approach will
foster the implementation of incremental protections for LGBT
people who, in many states, have been denied the opportunity to
marry.
I have included most of my letter in the hope that others
might use it to persuade policy makers at all levels, first of the
importance of equal marriage rights, and second that laws
banning equal marriage should not also limit domestic
partnerships. The article begins with a discussion of National
Pride at Work and several other recent court decisions regarding
4 748 N.W. 2d 524 (Mich. 2008).
5 MICH. CONST. 1963, art. 1, § 25 (providing that "[to] secure and preserve the
benefits of marriage for our society and for generations of children, the union of
one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as
a marriage or similar union.").
6 The term "LGBT" refers to lesbians, gay men, bisexual individuals and
transgender individuals.
7 The anti-marriage campaign is being led by individuals and groups who have
staked out a larger agenda to heap moral condemnation on LGBT people. For
example, James Dobson, who founded Focus on the Family, has written one of
the most popular books advocating against equal marriage. The Focus on the
Family website offers counseling for individuals experiencing "unwanted same-
sex attractions" and contains articles advocating against the "legitimization of
homosexual behavior." See Focus on the Family,
http://www.focusonthefamily.com/ (last visited June 8, 2009); JAMES DOBSON,
MARRIAGE UNDER FIRE (2007). Other conservative groups oppose both equal
marriage and what they term the larger "homosexual agenda." See, e.g., The
American Family Association, http://www.afa.net/ (last visited June 8, 2009);
The Family Research Council, http://www.frc.org/ (last visited June 8, 2009).
the scope of state unequal marriage amendments. The letter,
along with footnoted annotations, follows.
NATIONAL PRIDE AT WORK
The fight over equal marriage moved to the courts as soon
as the first discriminatory marriage amendments passed.8 The
National Pride case arose because a number of political entities
and educational institutions within the state of Michigan had
already adopted employee benefits policies that permitted LGBT
employees to elect health insurance coverage for their domestic
partners9 when Michigan voters passed that state's discriminatory
marriage amendment. In 2005, shortly after the Michigan
Constitution was amended, the state's Attorney General issued a
formal opinion concluding that these policies and agreements
violated the marriage amendment.1o
In response, the National Pride litigation was initiated."
The trial court declared that the Michigan constitutional
amendment did not bar public employers from providing health
insurance to the domestic partners of employees.12 That decision
was reversed by the Michigan Court of Appeals.l3 Thereafter, the
8 Freedom to Marry, Get Informed: Maps,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/get-informed/maps.php#amendments (last
visited June 8, 2009) (reporting that, as of June 2008, twenty-six states had
adopted constitutional amendments requiring unequal marriage, and two
states had pending proposals).
9 At issue in the National Pride case were policies at the city of Kalamazoo, the
Eaton/Clinton/Ingham County Community Mental Health Board, the State of
Michigan and several universities including the University of Michigan, Eastern
Michigan University and Wayne State University. 748 N.W. 2d at 529, at note
1.
10 Op. Mich. Att'y Gen., 2005 Mich. OAG No. 7171, 2005 WL 639112 (Mar. 16,
2005) (opinion issued in response to request by Michigan representative
regarding the continuing constitutionality of the city of Kalamazoo's partner
benefits policy in light of the Michigan constitutional amendment).
11 748 N.W. 2d at 529-30. (The plaintiff, Pride at Work, is an official
constituency group of the AFL-CIO, organized both to advocate for the interests
of LGBT union members as well as for LBGT equality in the workforce in
general). See Pride at Work: About Us,
http://prideatwork.org/page.php?id=63 (last visited on June 8, 2009); 748
N.W. 2d at 529 note 1 (a number of individuals and public entities affected by
the amendment and the Attorney General's opinion joined the lawsuit as
plaintiffs).
12 748 N.W. 2d at 530.
13 National Pride at Work v. Governor of Michigan, 732 N.W. 2d 139 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2007).
Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, finding the
domestic partner benefit policies unconstitutional. In so doing,
the court - while appearing to take a very constrained approach -
gave broad effect to the text of the amendment. It reasoned that
the amendment precluded the recognition of any unions that are
"similar to marriage" in any way. Publically recognized domestic
partnerships, it reasoned, did not have to mirror marriage or even
share a significant number of common characteristics with
marriage in order to run afoul of the amendment.14
The majority opinion in National Pride at Work is an
example of mindless and selective textualism.15 The court started
its reasoning by quoting Thomas Cooley, a pivotal figure in
American constitutional jurisprudence and a former Chief Justice
14 748 N.W. 2d at 533-37.
15 Recently two broad theoretical approaches to the interpretation of statutes
have emerged. The first, strongly identified with Justice Antonin Scalia, has
been labeled (primarily by its critics) as "textualism." Jane Schacter writes that
"[t]he hallmark of this "new textualism" is its emphasis on statutory language
and the "reasonable" meaning of the words used in a law. Textualists view
legislative intent as irrelevant on the theory that only a statute's text is subject
to the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment and thus
only the text represents formal 'law.' Unenacted, unspecified legislative
intentions, by contrast, escape the rigors of bicameralism and presentment and
thus cannot claim the legitimacy of statutory text." Jane Schacter, The Pursuit
of "Popular Intent:" Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J.
107, 118 (1995). In contrast, an intentionalist approach more readily looks to
legislative history and other sources beyond the words of the enactment. State
courts applying this approach to the interpretation of initiatives and referenda
often "explicitly identify popular intent as the object of their interpretive search,
using phrases like 'the 'collective intent' of the people,' "the voters' intent,' 'the
people ['s] inten[t],' the 'intent of the legislative body; in this case, the
electorate,' or the 'intent of the enacting body."' Id. at 117. Implicit in Schacter's
description is the difficulty of applying an interpretive approach in cases of
direct democracy. Others in addition to Schacter have written about the
difficulty of determining the intent behind initiatives and referenda. See, e.g.,
Ethan J. Leib, Interpreting Statutes Passed Through Referendums, 7 ELECTION
L.J. 49 (2008) (arguing that laws adopted through direct democracy should be
interpreted as the "average voter" might understand them, in part because
determining popular intent through non-text sources is too unpredictable and
difficult); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution,
Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477 (arguing, in part, that
because laws resulting from direct democracy lack the usual checks of the
legislative process and because determinations of "voter intent" are too
unpredictable, courts should be more free to impose rational limitations on the
scope and application of such laws).
of the Michigan Supreme Court.16 According to the Michigan
court, "[t]he primary objective in interpreting a constitutional
provision is to determine the original meaning of the provisions to
the ratifiers."17 Cooley's theory of constitutional interpretation
thus turned on discovering the understandings of people at the
time of the provision's adoption. He believed that constitutional
interpretation should be rooted in the text of the document as
understood by its drafters, i.e., that constitutional interpretation
should reflect the history and experiences of those drafters. 18
Unfortunately, although the Michigan court began with this
admonition that constitutional interpretation requires attention to
context, it immediately reverted to a myopic form of textualism,
working its way word by word through what it termed the
"operative language"19 of the amendment and uncritically
ascribing common dictionary definitions to each individual word
or phrase without regard to context. For example, relying upon
the dictionary definition of the word "union," the court concluded
that a domestic partnership was a union.20 Next, relying on the
dictionary definition of "similar" as "having a likeness or
resemblance, [especially] in a general way; having qualities in
common,"21 the court concluded that in order to be a union
"similar" to marriage, domestic partnership need not share many
traits in common with marriage. Rather, any overlap could
support the conclusion that domestic partnership is a "union"
"similar to marriage."22
16 HISTORY OF MICHIGAN LAW (Paul Finkelman & Martin J. Hershock eds.,
2006).
17 748 N.W. 2d at 533, (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 66 (1883).
18 Stephen A. Siegel, Historicism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional
Thought, 199o WIs. L. REV. 1431, 1505-10 (arguing that the "central technique
of [Cooley's theory of] constitutional interpretation is to read the constitutional
text through the prism of the Anglo-American common law."); Paul D.
Carrington, The Constitutional Law Scholarship of Thomas McIntyre Cooley,
41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 368, 399 (1997) (concluding that Cooley was a
"pragmatist ... trying to help courts shaping their constitutions to serve
citizens as they might have hoped to be served.").
19 748 N. W. 2d at 533 (the court focused on the second clause of the
amendment, dismissing the first clause as a "statement of purpose" and
implying that it was surplussage).
20 Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1991)).
21 Id. at 534-35.
22 Id. at 534-35.
Applying this reasoning, the court found two traits shared
by marriage and domestic partnership. First, both marriage and
domestic partnership have gender requirements: marriage is
determined by the gender of the partners (male-female), and
likewise the applicability of domestic partnership benefits
depends on the participants' gender (most provisions only applied
to same-sex partners).23 Second, both marriage and domestic
partnership preclude access from individuals who are close blood
relatives: marriage between close blood relatives is prohibited,
and the domestic partnership provisions similarly exclude closely-
related domestic partners. Because these two characteristics are
uniquely shared by marriage and domestic partnership, as
compared to other relationships entitled to public recognition, the
commonality supported the court's conclusion that marriage and
domestic partnership "resemble one another 'in a general way."' 24
The court viewed the similarities it identified as particularly
persuasive because, as it noted, "[a]lthough there are, of course,
many different types of relationships in Michigan law that are
accorded legal significance . . marriages and domestic
partnerships share two obviously important and apparently
unique (at least in combination) qualities in common."25
The problem with the Michigan Supreme Court's reasoning
is that it compared proverbial apples and oranges, i.e., it
compared formal statutory requirements for marriage with
informal, non-uniform characteristics of domestic partnership.
None of the various Michigan domestic partnership policies
purported to define or regulate domestic partnership in general;
they did not attempt to provide an exclusive or definitive approach
to domestic partnership. For example, although each of the local
Michigan policies permitted benefits to be conferred on same-sex
partners, none of the policies prohibited employees from having
different-sex domestic partners. Likewise, while the policies did
not extend benefits to domestic partners who were closely related
to an employee, none of the policies prohibited employees from
identifying a closely-related person as a domestic partner. In
short, neither Michigan law nor the benefits policies in question
purported to set forth an exclusive or comprehensive definition of
"domestic partnership."26 Rather the policies merely affirmatively
23 Id. at 535-37.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 535-36.
26 Across the country and the world, domestic partnerships often include
different sex individuals and persons who are closely related. See Sanford Katz,
established which types of domestic partners - those of the same
sex who were not closely related - were eligible for health
insurance coverage.2 7
Next the court examined the meanings of the terms
"recognize," "only agreement" and "for any purpose." Based on
dictionary definitions, it concluded that public employers who
conferred benefits on domestic partners of employees were
acknowledging the validity of such relationships and thus were
"recognizing" them.28 The court did not consider that the term
"recognize" may have had a more specific contextual legal
meaning. "Recognition" is a conflict of laws term which refers to
formal acceptance of and enforcement of the acts and judgments
of a sister state. 29 The court found this recognition of such
marriage-like relationships inconsistent with the constitutional
requirement that marriage be the "only agreement" "recognized"
in the state "for any purpose."30 Having concluded that domestic
partnership is a "union" "similar to marriage" and that offering
health benefits to domestic partners violated the proscription that
"Marriage" is the "only agreement" entitled to such "recognition"
"for any purpose," the court struck down the domestic partner
benefit policies at issue.31
The National Pride court's slavish attention to the
decontextualized, common definition of each individual word in
the amendment distorts the amendment's meaning in two
different ways. First, to use a trite adage, the court could not see
Emerging Models for Alternatives to Marriage, 33 FAm. L. Q. 663, 669-674
(1999) (arguing that domestic partnership policies have emerged not only to
provide a marriage alternative to same-sex couples, but also in response to the
increasing recognition of cohabitation among different sex couples). For
example, Salt Lake County, Utah has recently experimented with including an
employee's "adult designee" in its insurance coverage. Such a designee may be
either a straight or gay partner or may be some other person in the employee's
life. See Jeremiah Stettler, Gay Rights Issues: S.L. County OKs Adult-
Designees'Benefits, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Feb. 18, 2oo9), available at
http://www.sltrib.com/ci-11724319. See also Katherine Acey et al, Beyond
Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision for All Our Families and
Relationships, BEYONDMARRIAGE.ORG, July 26, 2oo6,
http://www.beyondmarriage.org/full-statement.html.
27 748 N.W. 2d 531-33.
28 Id. at 538-39.
29 See infra note 67.
30 Id. (as with the terms "similar" and "union," the court relied on the dictionary
to define these terms).
31 Id.
the forest for the trees. Context can qualitatively change or
enhance the meanings of words. For example, the opening clause
of the Preamble to the United States Constitution, "We the People
of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union... 32
can be distorted as follows: "The English speaking persons of the
United States, in order to give shape to a complete combination...
."33 The lyrical prose is not the only thing lost in the re-writing.
Despite its attention to one version of the exact meaning of each
word, this interpretation does not capture the sense of the
Constitution's Preamble. Context is everything. To understand
the Preamble, one must know that the Constitution replaced the
unworkable Articles of Confederation. The reference to a "more
perfect union" is likely a comparison to the earlier, less-than-
perfect Confederation.34 And while the founders were proposing a
new structural form for the infant government, the term "people"
probably did not include all persons living in the new country,
since blacks, Native Americans and women were each excluded
from participation in the constitution-making process and the new
government.35
Second, while adhering to the dictionary definitions of the
words in the amendment's "operative" text, the Michigan Supreme
Court conveniently dismissed completely the first clause of the
amendment.36 That clause provides that the amendment was
32 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
33 1 arrived at this interpretation by referring to the first definitions of words in
the first clause of the Preamble using WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE
DICTIONARY (4 th ed. 2004). The definition of people is "all the persons of a
racial, national, religious or linguistic group." The definition of form is "to give
shape or form to; make, as in some particular way." The definition of more is
"greater in amount, extent, degree or number." The definition of perfect is
"[c]omplete in all respects; without defect or omission; sound; flawless." The
definition of union is "a uniting or being united; combination."
34 See, e.g., Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869) ("The people, through
[the Constitution], established a more perfect union by substituting a national
government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the
Confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only
upon the States.").
35 See generally KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
36 748 N.W. 2d at 538-39 ("[T]he first part of the amendment states its purpose,
and the second part states the means by which this purpose is to be achieved.
Doubtless, there are those who would disagree about the efficacy of achieving
the former purpose by the latter means. However, it is not for this Court to
decide whether there are superior means for 'structur[ing] and preserv[ing] the
benefits of marriage or indeed whether the means chosen in the amendment
are ineffectual or even counterproductive.").
intended "[to] secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our
society and for future generations of children...." Pride at Work
argued that the first clause should be read to modify the second,
so that the amendment would only prohibit the extension of the
"benefits of marriage" to other types of relationships.37 It pointed
out that health insurance is not generally considered a benefit of
marriage and therefore its availability to domestic partners of
employees was not limited by the amendment. Yet the court
rejected this position, reasoning that the first clause of the
amendment was not the "operative" clause, but merely a
"statement of purpose" that apparently did not inform or limit the
amendment's remaining text. The court emphasized that "[tIhis
operative part [the second clause] specifies that public employers
must not recognize domestic partnerships for any purpose."38
Finally, apparently eschewing completely its initial
invocation of Justice Cooley's admonition that the "primary
objective" of constitutional interpretation is to determine the
intent of those who adopted the provision, the Michigan court
declined to consider the intent of the adopters. The advocacy
group responsible for placing the constitutional amendment on
the ballot had stated during the election campaign that the
amendment would not preclude public employers from offering
37 Jana Singer, The Privitization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1458-
6o (discussing the "incidents" or "obligations" of marriage as the "elements" of
the state-imposed marriage contract); Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Contractual
Ordering of Marriage: A New Modelfor State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204,230-
232 (1982) (noting that the incidents of marriage are those aspects of marriage
that were imposed upon the spouses by law and which traditionally could not
be modified by contract); Katherine Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the
Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 65, 83-86 (1998) (arguing that the
incidents or rights and obligations of marriage are those rights and duties to
which the spouses are held by law). See also Barbara J. Cox, Using an
"Incidents of Marriage"Analysis When Considering Interstate Recognition of
Same-Sex Couples 'Marriages, Civil Unions, And Domestic Partnerships, 13
WIDENER L.J. 699, 718-19 (2004) (employing a broad definition of the
"incidents of marriage" to argue for, at minimum, some interstate recognition
of same-sex marriage: "Incidents of marriage" refers to each of the specific
benefits, rights, or responsibilities flowing to a married couple based on their
marital status."); Mark Strasser, State Marriage Amendments and
Overreaching: On Plain Meaning, Good Public Policy, and Constitutional
Limitations, 25 LAW & INEQ. 59, 68-77 (2007) (arguing that because there is
little agreement on what the incidents or benefits of marriage are, some
unequal marriage amendments may be interpreted very broadly).
38 748 N.W.2d at 539.
health insurance benefits.39 Opponents of the amendment had
publically worried that its language could be interpreted to
preclude domestic partner benefits.40 Yet despite the prominence
of the domestic-partner-benefit issue during the campaign, the
court seemed to view this evidence of intent as merely electoral
noise. It made no attempt to sort out, categorize or weigh the
various interpretations of the amendment that had been
presented to the voters during the electoral campaign and
concluded instead that the most that could be said of the adopters'
intent was that there had been "debate" about the amendment's
meaning during the campaign.41
Beyond its mechanical and inconsistent attention to the
amendment's text, the Michigan court declined to address the
larger contextual question of whether domestic partnership
resembles marriage. For those who choose not to marry for
political or social reasons, or who are unable to marry, domestic
partnership has been commonly understood as an alternative to
marriage.42 These non-marital relationships, whether between
39 A brochure prepared by the proponents of the Michigan amendment stated
"[t]his is not about rights or benefits or how people choose to live their life. This
has to do with family, children and the way people are. It merely settles the
question once and for all what marriage is-for families today and future
generations." 748 N.W.2d at 541 note 22. During the campaign, counsel for the
proponents "asserted that the amendment would not prohibit public employers
from providing health insurance benefits to domestic partners." Id.
40 748 N.W.2d at 541 (quoting literature produced by the Michigan Civil Rights
Commission and other groups).
411d. at 542 ("Therefore, all that can reasonably be discerned from the extrinsic
evidence is this: before the adoption of the marriage amendment, there was
public debate regarding its effect, and this debate focused in part on whether
the amendment would affect domestic-partnership benefits."). This rejection of
an intentionalist approach to interpretation is not consistent with the emerging
norms for interpreting direct democracy enactments. See, e.g. Schacter, supra
note 15, at 149-50 (explaining that most courts reserve a strict textual approach
to legislation arising from a deliberative legislative process, but attempt to
discern popular intent when legislation results from direct democracy); Lieb,
supra note 15, at 54-56 (cataloguing the various interpretive approaches
employed by courts and stating that most courts "routinely refer to the voters'
intent as the linchpin in interpretation."); Cathy R. Silak, The People Act, The
Courts React: A Proposed Modelfor Interpreting Initiatives in Idaho, 33
IDAHO L. REV. 1, 62 (1996) (concluding that courts should avoid a strict textual
approach when interpreting initiatives and referenda and should attempt to
determine the voters' intent).
42 Nancy Polikoff has argued that marriage is not the most appropriate form of
family organization because of its history of oppression, especially of women,
and has argued that families should be defined by function and not by status.
See NANcY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND STRAIGHT AND GAY: VALUING ALL FAMILIES
persons of the same or different sexes, have often been
condemned by marriage proponents precisely because they are
not marriage and allegedly threaten marriage (presumably
because they are attractive alternatives to marriage and thus may
cause couples to decide not to marry at all).43 Regardless of the
merits of the debate, many marriage proponents appear to view
domestic partnership as inherently not marriage - outside, that is,
the current controversy over gay marriage.
Sorting out our public conception of marriage is difficult. I
do not mean by this point to invoke the debate about whether
governments should continue to recognize marriage as opposed to
some new and equal institution of civil unions.44 Rather, I mean
to suggest that the court should have asked what the public
characteristics of marriage are, and whether the provision of
UNDER THE LAW (2008); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For:
Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal
Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REv. 1535 (1993); Nancy D.
Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201 (2003);
Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic Partner
Principles Are One Step In The Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353
(2004). Before the debate over gay marriage, however, domestic partnership
laws had started to emerge as an alternative to marriage for different-sex
couples who eschewed marriage for political and social reasons. See Sanford
Katz, Emerging Models for Alternatives to Marriage, 33 FAM. L. Q. 663 (1999);
Martha M. Ertman, The ALI Principles'Approach to Domestic Partnership, 8
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 107 (2001). See generally, Mark Strasser, The
Future of Marriage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 87, 102-105 (2008)
(discussing state approaches to recognizing the needs of non-marital families).
43 See, e.g., Margaret Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for
Opposite Sex Couples, 7 J. L. & FAM STUD. 135, 177 (2005) (summarizing the
traditional critique of cohabitation). See also, Ruth L. Deech, The Case Against
Legal Recognition of Cohabitation, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 480 (1980); John
Leo, Marriage on the Rocks, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REP., Dec. 16, 2002, at 47;
Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law
Institute's 'Domestic Partners' Proposal, 2OOl BYU L. Rev. 1189, 1194 (arguing
that the ALl principals which propose formal recognition of domestic
partnership "seriously weaken and undermine the institution of marriage.").
44 For a quick take on this debate see MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, JUST MARRIAGE
(2004). See also, David Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV.
997, 1081-1083 (2002); Andrew Koppelman, Sexual and Religious Pluralism,
in SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE
215, 226-28 (Saul M. Olyan & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1998); Michael W.
McConnell, What Would it Mean to Have a "First Amendment"for Sexual
Orientation?, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 234, 248-51.
health benefits to domestic partners encroaches upon public
notions of marriage.45
Most writers on marriage readily concede that marriage
"has different meanings in different contexts."46 Marriage began
as a religious institution47 that eventually attained civil
recognition.48 Even as a religious institution, marriage has many
different forms, some of which are substantially out of sync with
current public conceptions of marriage in the U.S. For example, a
number of religions do not recognize divorce.49 Yet divergent
45 See Cruz, supra note 44, at 1078-84 (arguing that once marriage is
"disestablished" and the religious justifications for mixed-sex marriage are
deconstructed, there is no justification for the continued public adherence to a
mixed-sex requirement for marriage).
46 Lynn D. Wardle, What is Marriage?, 6 WHITFIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOCACY
53, 58-59 (2OO6) (pointing out that psychological, social and religious
understanding among different groups of people vary substantially but arguing
that "as a matter of contemporary and historical legal positivism, and deeply
imbedded legal realism, marriage nearly universally today and uniformly
throughout western tradition has been the union of a man and a woman.");
NANCY F. ConT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 1 (2000)
("Marriage is like the sphinx - a conspicuous and recognizable monument on
the landscape, full of secrets.").
47 Cott observes "[t]he common sense of the British colonials at the time of the
American Revolution was Christian; Christian common sense took for granted
the rightness of monogamous marriage."). Cott, supra note 46, at 9.
48 Michael Grossberg describes the situation in England and, in turn, in the
American Colonies: "English law demanded that brides and grooms negotiate a
five-step nuptial course: espousals, publication of banns, execution of the
espousal contract at church, celebration, and sexual consummation. Yet
clandestine marriages flourished in early modem England as dissenters,
couples fleeing parental opposition, and others flocked to clergymen willing to
perform private marriages for a fee.... [C]ouples who contracted and
consummated their unions generally won legal recognition from the
ecclesiastical courts that governed nuptials. But the gap between law and
practice proved vexing for the English and their colonists." MICHAEL
GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 65 (1988).
49 The Catholic Church does not recognize divorce. Observant Catholics must
obtain an annulment of their marriages in order to be eligible to remarry. See
Fr. Leonard Kennedy, The Annulment Crisis in the Church, CATHOLIC INSIGHT,
Mar. 1999, available at
http://www.catholicinsight.com/online/church/divorce/cannul.shtml ("The
Catholic Church does not accept divorce. Jesus insisted on the original
intention of the Creator who willed that marriage be indissoluble." (Mt 5:31-21;
19:3-9; Mk 1o:9; Lk 16:18; 1 Cor 7:1o-11). However, the Church can declare the
nullity of a marriage, i.e., declare that the marriage never existed (Code of
Canon Law, #1095-1107; see also the Catechism of the Catholic Church under
"Divorce"). See also Lindsay L. Abbate, Comment: What God Has Joined "Let"
religious marriage practices have not impeded the development of
a separate law of public marriage.50 In evaluating whether state
actions constitute an approximation of marriage, it is important
that reference be made to this separate norm of public marriage as
opposed to idiosyncratic parochial conceptions of marriage held
by various religious believers.
The public law of marriage, in addition to dictating who
may be married, also establishes who may officiate at a marriage
ceremony, what obligations and rights marriage involves, and
whether and how a marriage may be ended.51 The health
insurance policies at issue in the Michigan case did not dictate
who could enter into domestic partnership, nor did they establish
a mechanism for officiating or licensing domestic partnerships.
Nor did the policies establish any rights and obligations for
domestic partnership beyond the eligibility for health insurance
coverage. And finally, the domestic partnership policies at issue
did not regulate when and how a domestic partnership could be
dissolved. The National Pride court's myopic examination of the
text and unwillingness to examine the amendment through the
lens of context, enabled it to ignore these overarching distinctions
between domestic partnership and marriage.
Hopefully, National Pride at Work will not influence future
courts' interpretations of partner benefit policies in light of
discriminatory marriage amendments. The opinion's myopic,
inconsistent approach and its failure to attend either to the
specific context of the Michigan amendment or to the larger
context of domestic partnership and marriage, should undermine
its influence. For now, however, it stands out as the only
precedent in the area. Although litigation has been one of the
primary fronts upon which the LGBT civil rights movement has
Man Put Asunder: Ireland's Struggle Between Cannon and Common Law
Relating to Divorce, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 583 (2002) (discussing the friction
between Catholic cannon law and Irish law regarding the availability of divorce
and annulment). Likewise, many Jews believe that only a man may initiate
divorce. See Jessica Davidson Miller, The History of the Agunah in America: A
Clash of Religious Law and Social Progress, 19 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 1 (1997).
50 For example, in the end, opposition to no-fault divorce did not succeed in
preventing no-fault reform from being adopted in most states. See HERBERT
JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES (1988); J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE
POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
(1997).
51 CoTr, supra note 46, at 2-3.
advanced in recent years, the Michigan opinion stands as evidence
that courts will not uniformly provide relief from oppressive
unequal enactments aimed at stigmatizing and penalizing LGBT
people, and underscores the importance of political persuasion to
advance the cause of LGBT civil rights.
National Pride at Work is the first - and so far only - case
to consider the reach of a state's unequal marriage amendment.
In addition to its specific context, however, the opinion should be
understood in the larger and more supportive context of LGBT
civil rights litigation. Prior litigation has focused on whether the
exclusion of LGBT people from the various benefits of marriage is
constitutional as a matter of state and federal equality and
substantive due process considerations. Early successes in equal
marriage cases at the state level, in cases such as Baehr v. Lewin52
and Baker v. Vermont,53 have resulted from the application of
52 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In Baehr, several same-sex couples who were
denied marriage licenses filed suit against the State of Hawai'i arguing that
Hawai'i's statute defining marriage as between a man and a woman violated
their right to privacy and discriminated against them on the basis of gender.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' privacy argument but held
that the limitation of marriage to individuals of different sexes was a sex-based
classification that was subject to strict scrutiny. On remand, the court held the
Hawai'i marriage law unconstitutional. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235
(Hawai'i Cir.Ct. Dec 03, 1996), affirmed, 87 Haw. 34, 950 P.2d 1234 (1997). In
1998, the voters in Hawai'i amended the state constitution permitting the
legislature to define marriage as between a man and a woman. The legislature
did so and established a state-wide registration system for same-sex couples
that conferred some of the benefits of marriage on registrants. For a brief
summary of the litigation in Baehr v. Lewin see Lambda Legal: Baehr v. Miike,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-work/in-court/cases/baehr-v-miike.html
(last visited June 8, 2009). The litigation in Baehr touched off a national panic
among conservative groups who feared that their states would be compelled to
recognize Hawai"s same-sex marriages. One result was the enactment at the
federal level of the Defense of Marriage Act, and of state Defense of Marriage
Acts in 38 states. See Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110
Stat. 2419 (codified in 1 U.S.C. §7 and 28 U.S.C. §1738C); Human Rights
Campaign - State, http://www.hrc.org/laws-and-elections/state.
asp (last visited June 8, 2009). These laws expressly defined marriage as
between a man and woman and set forth the policy of the federal government
and the various states against recognition of same-sex marriages performed in
other states.
53 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). Several same-sex couples sought a declaratory
judgment that failure to issue them marriage licenses violated both Vermont's
marriage law (which at the time did not expressly provide that marriage was
between a man and a woman), and their equality rights under the state
constitution's common benefits clause (similar to an equal protection
provision). The Vermont Supreme Court stopped short of holding that the
equal protection analysis and have brought courts to the forefront
in the movement to recognize equal marriage. While these
successes were only partial - neither court actually recognized
equal marriage54 - they set the stage for the decision of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health,55 which required the state of Massachusetts to
recognize equal marriage. What is more, although efforts have
since been made to amend the state constitution and overturn
Goodridge, such efforts have proved unsuccessful.56
Since Goodridge, several additional state courts have
struck down discriminatory marriage statutes on equal protection
grounds.57 Local officials around the country have attempted, so
marriage law should be extended to same-sex couples, but instead held that
discrimination against such couples in providing public benefits violated the
state's constitutional equality provisions.
54 See Lambda Legal, supra note 52. In response to the decision in Baker, the
Vermont legislature enacted a civil union statute that gives same-sex couples all
the same rights, benefits and responsibilities under state law as married
persons. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §1204(a) (2000). Vermont's law was far-
reaching in its protection of LGBT couples, but by enacting a civil union statute
instead of amending its marriage law to allow same-sex marriage, the state
deprived Vermont civil unions of certain recognition of their relationships in
other states. See Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of
Marriage, 25 VER. L. J. 15 (2000) (discussing the Vermont statute); Lewis A.
Silverman, Vermont Civil Unions, Full Faith and Credit, and Marital Status,
89 KY. L. J. 1075 (2001) (discussing interstate recognition of Vermont Civil
Unions); Emily Sack, Civil Unions and the Meaning of the Public Policy
Exception at the Boundaries of Domestic Relations Law, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV.
497 (2005) (discussing full faith and credit issues generally with regard to civil
unions and domestic partnerships).
55 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
56 See Tonja Jacobi, Sharing the Love: The Political Power of Remedial Delay
in Same-Sex Marriage Cases, 15 L. & SEXUALITY 11, 40-41 (2006).
57 Varnum v. O'Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding that sexual
orientation is a "quasi-suspect" classification and striking down gender
limitations in the state's marriage statute as violative of equal protection);
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008)
(holding unconstitutional various portions of Connecticut's exclusionary
marriage schemes on the basis of equal protection and substantive due process,
reasoning that lesbians and gays were a suspect classification and that
intermediate scrutiny should be applied to the state's law restricting marriage
to different-sex couples, and recognizing that a broad civil union statute did not
provide the same benefits as marriage); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J.
2006) (rejecting the argument that the fundamental right to marry included
same-sex marriage, but finding that conferring public benefits based on
marriage violated the equal protection rights of gay men and lesbians). State
court marriage litigation has not always been successful. See, e.g., Hernandez
v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (rejecting both substantive due process and
far with only limited success, to use their power to officiate
marriages between same-sex couples in an attempt to force
Goodridge-type reviews under their own state constitutions.58 In
other states, activists have sought injunctions ordering local
officials to perform same-sex marriages despite contrary state
law.59 Most recently, two state legislatures have moved to
authorize same-sex marriages. 60
At the federal level, the United States Supreme Court has
slowly begun to recognize that state attempts to fence LGBT
people out of public and political life are unconstitutional. In
Romer v. Evans,61 the Court struck down a Colorado law that
barred LGBT people civil rights protections, reasoning that moral
disapproval of homosexuality was not a legitimate governmental
end. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down a Texas
sodomy statute reasoning that "[m]oral disapproval of a group
cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal
Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be 'drawn
for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the
law.'"
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The federal cases, however, have stopped short of clearly
announcing that gays and lesbians are covered by the same
equality principals that might protect other disfavored groups
from adverse governmental actions. In Romer the court did not
apply heightened scrutiny or recognize LGBT people as a suspect
class. 63 While the Lawrence opinion is more ambiguous about
equal protection attacks on New York's marriage law); Dean v. District of
Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995) (rejecting both an equal protection
and a substantive due process challenge to the District of Columbia's marriage
law); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (holding that Maryland's
marriage law did not violate the state constitution).
58 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P. 3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (consolidating six cases
growing out of the decision by San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom to begin
officiating same-sex marriages; holding that restrictions on same-sex marriage
violated due process and privacy provisions of the state constitution). For a
discussion of this strategy, see Sylvia A. Law, Who Gets to Interpret the
Constitution: the Case of Mayors and Marriage Equality, 3 STAN. J. CIv. RTS. &
Civ. LIBERTIES 1 (2007).
59 See, e.g., Anderson v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006); Hernandez v.
Robles, 26 A.D.3d 98, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (2005).
60 2009 Vermont Laws No. 3 (S115).
61517 U.S. 620 (1996).
62 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003).
63 Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481, 512-13
(2004) (pointing out the use of rational basis review in Romer, but arguing that
whether it applied heightened scrutiny, it also failed to expressly
recognize LGBT people as members of a suspect class. 64 Thus,
while these cases are the beginning of a federal law of LGBT
equality, their possible impact on state attempts to preserve
discriminatory marriage laws is less than clear.65
THE LETFER
You asked whether Article III, Section 28 of the Idaho
Constitution precludes the City of Moscow from adopting a policy
permitting employees to elect health insurance benefits for the
their same-sex domestic partners. Article III, Section 28 provides:
"Marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic legal
union that shall be valid or recognized in this state."66  The
question raised by the City of Moscow's policy is whether
since the 1970s the court has slowly been moving toward more rigorous rational
basis review and suggesting that the court is slowly abandoning its traditional
three tiered review in substantive due process and equal protection cases).
64 Id. Much has been written about the Court's enigmatic due process analysis
in Lawrence. See, e.g., Pam Karlan, Forward: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 1447, 1449 (2004) (observing, in the Forward to a Symposium Issue on
Lawrence, that in that case the Court "sidestepped" the traditional tiered
structure of due process and equal protection analysis); Goldberg, supra note
63, at 512-13 (arguing that Romer and Lawrence are part of a new, still
emerging, approach to substantive due process and equal protection analysis);
Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & the Refinement of Substantive Due
Process, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 30-31 (2005) (attempting to parse the
language in Lawrence to support an argument for heightened scrutiny).
6 5 See Bryan K. Fair, Ultimate Associations: Same-Sex Marriage and the Battle
Against Jim Crow's Other Cousin, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 269 (2008) (arguing
that restrictions on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional and that, if
tolerated, signal a return to that separate-but-equal jurisprudence that
supported Jim Crow); Sharon Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?:
The Proper Methodology When Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 685 (2008) (arguing that when the appropriate
constitutional analysis is employed, courts should conclude that state bans on
gay marriage are unconstitutional); Strasser, supra note 36 (reviewing the
various marriage amendments and arguing that if broadly construed, they
violate the federal constitution); Toni Lester, Adam and Steve vs. Adam and
Eve: Will the New Supreme Court Grant Gays the Right to Marry?, 14 AM. U.
J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 253, 278-310 (2006) (arguing that the state marriage
amendments may be unconstitutional); Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer &
Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes Out of the Closet, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 355, 408-433 (2OO6) (arguing that together Romer & Lawrence evidence a
new approach to Fourteenth Amendment analysis that can be the basis for
striking down discriminatory legislation).
66 IDAHO CONST. art. III, §28.
providing health benefits constitutes the official recognition or
validation of a "domestic legal union" other than marriage.6 7
First, conferring health insurance benefits on the intimate
partners of employees is not akin to officially recognizing or
validating a marriage between employees and their intimate
partners. The language of the marriage amendment implies that
official recognition is what is barred.68 Because informal actions
67 See Strasser, supra note 37, at 66-67 (describing the language of the various
state marriage discrimination amendments). Idaho's amendment appears to
resemble those in other states that bar "approximations of marriage. Id.
68 The terms "valid" and "recognized" used in Article III, Section 28 are not
unique to the anti-gay marriage amendments. Rather they are generally
accepted terms of art in the area of conflicts of law and must be understood in
this context. These exact terms are used in Idaho's statutory provision
regarding recognition of out of state marriages. Section 32-209 of the Idaho
code is entitled "Recognition of foreign or out-of-state marriages" and provides:
"All marriages contracted without this state, which would be valid by the laws
of the state or country in which the same were contracted, are valid in this
state, unless they violate the public policy of this state." IDAHO CODE § 32-209
(1996). As is clear from the law of conflicts generally, and from the language of
the Idaho statute "validity" is determined by local law - that is, in the case of
same sex marriage, the law of the state in which the marriage is performed.
The general choice of law rule regarding the validity of marriage is that the local
law in which the ceremony was performed should be the law chosen to validate
the marriage. See Restatement (second) of Conflict of Law § 283; Unif.
Marriage & Divorce Act § 210; ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 138 (1962)(discussing the general rule of validation of
marriages). Where a state applies this rule of validation, it can be said to
"recognize" the marriage. See EUGENE F. SCOLES, ET AL, CONFLICT OF LAWS §13.6
at 566 (4 ed. 2004)("Under the usual view in the United States, first
consideration in assessing the validity of a marriage is to determine compliance
with the requirements of the law where the alleged marriage took place. If the
parties comply with the rules of the place the marriage is celebrated, they
usually will be recognized elsewhere as husband and wife...."). When a sister
state marriage is "recognized", it is treated as valid for all purposes in the
recognizing state. See Barbara Cox, Using an "Incidents of Marriage"Analysis
When Considering Interstate Recognition of Same Sex Couples'Marriages,
Civil Union, and Domestic Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L. J. 699, 718-719
(2004)(pointing out that courts have generally "viewed the term 'marriage' as
,an all purpose concept"' and have accorded "universal recognition" to
marriage), citing Willis L. M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws,
26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 952, 952(1977).
Making health benefits available to the families of employees does not
constitute recognition of marriage because it does not invoke the state's
marriage powers in any way that is enforceable against others or that requires
the respect of other states or governments. Rather the provision of health
benefits is akin to a private contract - enforceable between the parties, but not
obligating new parties to enter the same contract. The decision of an employer
to offer partner benefits does not obligate other employers to offer such
acknowledging same-sex relationships do not invoke the official
power of the state in any way and do not make such relationships
otherwise binding or enforceable, they should not be swept into
the reach of the amendment. For example, marriages are licensed
by the state of Idaho and may be dissolved only through death or a
court order. The act of state licensing is what requires other states
to accord full faith and credit to a valid marriage entered into in a
state. 69 Yet no such comparable recognition occurs when a public
employer offers health insurance to its employees. Nor does the
enforceability of a same-sex relationship change merely through
the provision of health insurance.
Health insurance and marriage are not intuitively related to
each other.70 Health benefits are commonly extended to many
individuals other than spouses.71 For example, many employer-
benefits. Thus the provision of benefits does not make domestic partnerships
legally enforceable or binding in any way. Such a policy merely ensures that
while the relationship continues, benefits will be available.
69 The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires states to
respect the "official acts" of sister states. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The goal of
the clause is to promote uniformity among the states but also to protect the
sovereignty of an individual state's ability to undertake official acts without
being undermined by a sister state. See generally James D. Sumner, Jr., The
Full Faith and Credit Clause--Its History and Purpose, 34 OR. L. REV. 224
(1955); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public
Acts: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33 (1957); Mark
D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional:
Lawrence, Full Faith And Credit, and the Many Societal Actors that Determine
What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915 (2006).
70 The proponents of benefits for same-sex domestic partners made this
argument unsuccessfully in National Pride at Work. See 748 N.W. 2d at 538-
39 note 18 (Kelly, J., dissenting); cf. Snetsinger v. Montana University System,
104 P.3d 445 (Mont. 2004) (reversing the trial court's dismissal of a claim that
the state university system engaged in unconstitutional discrimination by
giving health benefits to the different sex partners of university employees but
not to the same-sex partners of such employees, and pointing out that the
qualification for benefits under the university policy was not truly based on
marriage).
71 In two separate orders, for example, the judges of the United States Court
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued orders requiring the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts to certify same-sex spouses,
married under California's same-sex marriage law, for participation in the
federal employee health program. See In the Matter of Karen Golinski, 3 (9th
Cir. Jan. 13, 2009) available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/articlefiles/
Jan13_2oo9_USCA9_EDROrder.pdf (Judge Kozinski construed the word
"family" in the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8903(1) to
authorize the federal Office of Personnel Management to contract for health
insurance to include family members other than spouses and children, such as
provided health care plans extend benefits to older children who
are no longer dependents, grandchildren and stepchildren.72
Between an adult and a child, the relationship most parallel to
marriage would be adoption. Yet coverage for a stepchild does not
equate to an adoption of the child by the employee-stepparent.
Thus, the inclusion of such family members within the coverage of
a health plan does not constitute the recognition of a "domestic
legal union" between the employee and the family member.
Not only is the extension of employer health coverage to
family members not indicative of marriage, but the availability of
such coverage is not a characteristic of marriage. Certainly
marriage is one of the most common bases upon which benefits
are extended to intimate partners, but it would be a stretch to say
that the availability of health benefits is one of the major
characteristics of marriage.73 Few heterosexual persons get
married solely to become eligible for health benefits.74 In many
situations, spousal health coverage is unavailable. Even where
subsidized spousal health benefits are provided, no law requires a
person to cover her or his spouse.75 Thus, the provision of health
insurance is not generally considered one of the duties that
married couples owe one another. Rather married couples owe a
general duty of support, which may include the provision of
parents or siblings living in an employee's household); In the Matter of Brad
Levenson (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 2009) available at http://www.ceg.uscourts.
gov/articlefiles/Feb.2_2oo9 final FPD ERD ORD.pdf (order by Judge
Stephen Reinhardt finding that the denial of federal benefits to same-sex
employees is likely to be found unconstitutional).
72 Adoption is an officially-recognized, state-created parent-child relationship.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §16-1501-15. See also Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy
Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 32-35 (2000) (discussing
adoption and marriage as state-sanctioned ways to create legally cognizable
relationships).
73 The debate over gay marriage has revived a lively discussion of what rights
constitute "incidents of marriage." See, e.g., Mark Strasser, An Amendment to
Protect Marriage, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 387 (2006).
74 Securing health insurance does not show up as a reason to marry in popular
relationship counseling books. See, e.g., ELIZABETH MARTYN, BEFORE YOU SAY I
Do (2003) (listing five good reasons to marry, e.g. because the couple is in love,
they want to make a commitment, their culture expects marriage, to start a
family, to celebrate, and it's the right time).
75 State insurance laws authorize but do not require the coverage of spouses on
health insurance. See, e.g., Irina Dushi & Marjorie Honig, Price and Spouse's
Coverage in Employee Demand for Health Insurance, (Feb. 25, 2003)
(undocumented work, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=36258o)
(explaining that higher premiums cause employees to opt out of available
coverage, such as coverage for spouses).
insurance. But no court would require a spouse to maintain
insurance for the other spouse.76
Finally, the availability of health insurance to an
employee's intimate partner does not entitle the partners to any of
the official benefits conferred upon married persons by the state.77
For example, they remain ineligible for a marriage license and
other means of solemnizing their relationship under state law.
Children born to one partner are not presumed to be children of
the other; the non-biological parent of such children is not
entitled to child custody and likewise does not have a duty to pay
child support. The partners are not treated as spouses for
purposes of consenting to medical care, inheritance, surviving
spouse benefits, or income tax. Nor are they entitled to recover
for loss of consortium or wrongful death of the other partner. If
the relationship breaks down, the partners are not protected by
the laws of divorce, spousal support, or equitable distribution. In
short, the intimate partner relationship in which one partner's
employer-provided health insurance covers the other does not
legally resemble a marriage in any way.
The Idaho Attorney General's opinion,78 which takes the
position that the anti-gay marriage amendment bars
municipalities within Idaho from offering domestic partner
benefits, is based in part on the "Effect of Adoption" and "for" and
"against" statements that appeared on the ballot with the
constitutional amendment. It is also based on the A.G.'s analysis
of precedent in Washington and Michigan. As the A.G. notes, the
following language appeared on the ballot:
If adopted the proposed amendment would add language to
the Constitution of the State of Idaho to provide that a
76 State courts have held that a spouse's duty of support requires him or her to
summon medical care when a spouse needs it. A spouse can be held
responsible to third parties for the other spouse's medical bills. But the case
law has never gone so far as to require spouses to provide health insurance or to
pay for available coverage. See Twila Perry, The Essentials of Marriage:
Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1,
12-14 (2003).
77 As part of the debate regarding gay marriage, many have categorized the list
of rights, duties and responsibilities relating to marriage that are not available
to LGBT couples. The ABA Family Law Section has published one of the most
comprehensive and well documented lists. See ABA Section on Family Law, A
White Paper: An Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil
Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L. Q. 339 (2004).
78 Op. Idaho Att'y Gen. No. 08-21508 (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with the author).
marriage is only between a man and a woman. The
language prohibits recognition by the state of Idaho and its
political subdivisions of civil unions, domestic
partnerships, or any other relationship that attempt to
approximate marriage. The language further prohibits the
state and its political subdivision from granting any or all
of the legal benefits of marriage to civil unions, domestic
partnerships, or any other relationship that attempts to
approximate marriage.79
In addition, the A.G.'s opinion cites some of the "for" and
"against" statements that were also included on the ballot. The
opinion assumes that these statements control the interpretation
of Article III, Section 28.
The "Effect of Adoption" and the "for" and "against"
statements are important interpretive sourcesso They explain the
intentions of the leading proponents and opponents of the
amendment. Essentially the "Effect of Adoption" and "for" and
"against" provisions are akin to legislative history. However,
under most cannons of statutory construction, courts turn first to
the plain language of the statute for purposes of statutory
interpretation.s1 If the language of the statute is unclear or
ambiguous, courts construing statutes will then turn to legislative
history to provide interpretive context for the meaning of an
enactment's words and to provide insight. The Idaho intent
documents do not address the ability of municipalities to offer
health insurance to the domestic partners of employees. Rather
these documents stress that the amendment was intended to
preclude any official recognition of same-sex relationships as
marriages, and to bar the recognition or validation of
relationships that are "approximations of marriage."8 2 Moreover,
79 Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added in the Attorney General's Opinion) (quoting the
purpose statement from Idaho H.J.R. No. 2 (2006)).
8o See generally, supra note 15 and accompanying texts for more discussion of
the role of intent in interpreting amendments.
82 The purpose statement specifically uses the term "approximates." Its first
statement is that "[t]he language of this bill, including the term 'domestic legal
union' is intended to protect marriage as being only between a man and a
woman." See HJR2, supra note 79. The purpose statement also provides that
"[i]t is the intent that the language of this bill shall not (a) interfere with the
ability of persons or entities to enter into private contracts .... " This language
from the legislative statement of purpose was not included by the Secretary of
the intent documents make clear that only the "benefits of
marriage" are restricted by the amendment. As pointed out
earlier, health insurance can hardly be said to be a benefit of
marriage.
The intent documents also support the argument that
employment benefits for domestic partners are not implicated by
the amendment. The purpose language provides that the
amendment does not "interfere" with contracts between "persons
or entities," an oblique reference to unofficial contractual ordering
in support of same-sex relationships - such as employment
contracts which provide benefits. 83 Moreover the intent
documents underscore the earlier point of this letter that the
amendment's terms "recognition" and "validation" should be
limited to official acts of the state and not informal
acknowledgments of employees' personal relationships. 84
The most logical interpretation of the marriage amendment
is that it does not limit the ability of the state and its subdivisions
to recognize non-marital relationships, so long as those
relationships are not elevated to such an extent that their
recognition could be an approximation of marriage. States
recognize many types of relationships that share some common
characteristics with marriage but are nonetheless not marriage.
For example, the state-recognized evidentiary privileges common
between spouses also exist between attorneys and their clients, as
State in the "Statement of Meaning and Purpose." See Id. The ballot language
is available on the Idaho Secretary of State's website at http://
www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/inits/o6-sjrlo7-stmnt-effect.htm (last visited
June 8, 2009).
83 Not only does the purpose statement refer specifically to relationships that
"approximate marriage," the "Statements FOR the Proposed Amendment"
drafted by the Idaho Legislative Council and included in state-sponsored voter
pamphlets consistently refer to state policy regarding marriage. The first and
fourth statements emphasize that the amendment does not change existing
Idaho Law ("Same gender marriages are not currently allowed under Idaho
statutes, and this amendment provides for the same prohibition at the state
constitutional level to ensure that Idaho state courts do not allow or require the
recognition of same gender marriages.... This amendment does not deny any
existing rights under Idaho law, but Idaho's current marriage laws could be
weakened in the future without this amendment."). Ben Ysura, Idaho Sec. of
State, 2006 HJR2 Statements For and Against, available at
http://www.idsos.state.id.us/elect/inits/o6 hjr2-stmnt forandagainst.htm.
84 The purpose statement refers exclusively to limitations on the "State of Idaho
and its political subdivisions" and refers to granting "legal benefits of
marriage." Id.
well as doctors and their patients.8 5 Likewise, the state recognizes
that parents may claim children as dependents on a tax return,
just as spouses may be claimed as dependents. 86 The state also
recognizes that business partners may be held liable for debts
incurred by other business partners, just as a spouse may be held
liable for the debts of the other spouse.8 7 Further, the state
recognizes that cotenants in property share co-management of
that property, just as spouses share co-management of community
property. 88 Each of these types of relationships shares some
governmental treatment in common with marriage, yet no one
would suggest that such common treatment morphs these other
relationships into marital relationships. Nor does Article III,
Section 28 preclude the state from conferring some benefits on the
relationship between same-sex partners that may also be
conferred upon married spouses.
I strongly encourage the City Council to approve the policy
providing health insurance benefits to the domestic partners of
city employees. This policy sends a message that Moscow is a
welcoming place. It reflects the sentiment of voters in the city
who overwhelmingly voted against the unequal marriage
amendment. The policy signals that the City of Moscow intends to
grapple with the real-world needs of city employees and their
families. I believe that the policy will contribute to increased
productivity by city employees.8 9 Further, it will assist the City in
attracting high quality employees and will position the city to
85 See Richard A. Laws, Comment: Underprivileged: What's Wrong With Rule
516, 40 IDAHO L. REv. 695, 695-97 (2004) (comparing the various privileges
provided for under the Idaho Rules of Evidence).
86 See Idaho State Tax Commission, 2008 Individual Income Tax Instructions
3, available at http://tax.idaho.gov/
pdf/2oo8/EPBOOoo4i10-24-2oo8.pdf (explaining the Idaho provisions for
claiming both spouses and children as dependents).
8 7 See Alexandria Striech, Comment: Spousal Fiduciaries in the Marital
Partnership: Marriage Means Business But the Sharks Do Not Have A Code
of Conduct, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 367(1998) (comparing marriage and business
partnerships on questions of mutual liability for breach of fiduciary duty).
88 Compare IDAHO CODE § 55-104 and IDAHO CODE § 32-912.
89 Many private employers offer domestic partner benefits. The Human Rights
Campaign reports that 49% of Fortune 500 companies and 78% of Fortune loo
companies offer such benefits. See Samir Luter, Domestic Partner Benefits:




compete with private employers who offer similar benefits.9O
Most importantly, by adopting this policy the City of Moscow will
be treating its employees with the dignity and respect to which
they are entitled.91
90 See, e.g., Alene Russell, American Association of State Colleges and
Universities, Domestic Partnership Benefits: Equity Fairness and Competitive
Advantage (October 2007), available at
http://www.aascu.org/policy matters/
pdf/domestic partnerso7.pdf (arguing that domestic partner benefits are
increasingly a competitive lever in higher education necessary to recruit and
retain top employees).
91 The Moscow, Idaho City Council approved the policy providing benefits for
the domestic partners of same-sex employees in February, 2008, three months
after the anti-gay marriage amendment was adopted in Idaho. At the time the
mostly conservative, business-oriented council was threatened with suit.
Opponents of gay marriage disparaged the city and implied that they would file
lawsuits that would be costly to the residents of the city. To date, nothing has
happened.
